Manila is one of the world's most fragmented, privatized and un-public 
thoroughfares adjacent to a major road artery, the older residential property in the street is gradually giving away to multi-storied apartments and medium-rise retail and commercial property. In any typical street it is the small things that stand out. In this Quezon City street, it is the quality of tiling at the entrance of one of these new medium-rise buildings. It catches the eye because it has a finish that is often lacking in Manila buildings. This is a city where the ready availability of very cheap labor means that employers and developers habitually use untutored backs in place of skilled hands. To the passer-by, the building entrance looks immaculate. Yet, what is equally evident is the public frame of this polished craftwork. The building entrance abuts a commonplace Manila footpath-a crumbling wreck of a pathway. In the micro-world of the street, in one quick step, the passer-by moves from the smooth space of the regular tiled portico to a striated space filled with enough irregular-shaped rises and falls to make a contemporary mathematical topologist gleeful in perpetuity.
While the mathematician may find undulating topologies fascinating, the walker finds them annoying. The typical footpath in Manila, if it exists at all, is difficult and frustrating to negotiate. It is almost always an instance of obstructive distortion. The state of the footpaths is representative of the travails of public space in the Philippine city. To cross the threshold into a private building is often exhilarating for someone on foot, because it means escaping the dented topology of walking space into space organized around more classical, and more emotionally satisfying, geometries.
Classical geometries of space-be they Euclidean, Gothic, Cartesian, or postEuclidean-are the invisible sub-structure of a visible order. Euclidean solid geometry, Neoplatonic Gothic geometry, Descartes' coordinate geometry, and cubist-type n-dimensional geometry are key building blocks that define a city's pattern rationality. This applies at every level-from the microcosm of the tile to the macrocosm of the city plan. The reason for the success of autopoietic city building based on geometric form is that human beings find such patterns deeply satisfying. Patterns are a bridge between emotion and reason. The qualities that patterns represent are encapsulated in the idea of beauty. These qualities-such as grace, elegance, and economy-are both descriptions of reason and objects of feelings. How a city, from path to street to block, and beyond, is designed is a work of collective affective rationality.
Through the template of patterns, the collective force of a city over generations engages in an act of collective design. The successes and failures of the demiurgic project are dependent on many factors-most of them lying beyond conscious manipulation or legislation. The greatest test of demiurgic success is the quality of public space. Public space that "works" is a pure expression of collective reason. Such space is accessible to, enjoyed by, amenable to, and representative of everyone in the society. It is deeply satisfying space.
Public space is a force that shapes the collective demiurge. The demiurge in turn gives shape to public space. This circularity often breaks down in practice. When that break occurs, the result is what we see in cities like Manila. There are good, attractive, interesting spaces in the city-but, for the most part, they are not public spaces. Good space in Manila is mostly private space, like the portico of the building described before. It is the space of private houses and apartments, university campuses, and gated communities. Some of these spaces are attractive-certainly many are pleasant. Yet they mostly appear as places of relief from the cracked topology of public space and the stresses of negotiating it. Gates and walls almost universally protect these private spaces. Where people can afford it, ubiquitous armed guards patrol the threshold between public and private. The Philippines is possibly the first society in the world to have universalized the gated community. The most visible emblems of this are the walled communities of the wealthy. But, unlike California where it is only the wealthy who want to retreat behind gates into sanitized invisibility, everyone except the utterly dispossessed in the Philippines erects gates and fences and walls around their property and around themselves. Even the most modest dwellings are gated with ceiling-high wrought-iron fences.
Rich and poor alike have their own security guards and private armies.
Filipinos have even learnt to burrow into pocket space while on the move. Anyone who can afford it drives an automobile to avoid having to walk around the streets. The private car is probably more prized than even the private residence. Immaculately maintained and mostly new, Filipino cars on the road act like mobile bubbles of sanctuary from unpalatable public space. In the car, drivers and passengers escape the discordance of the streets behind the almost hermetic seal of the bubble. The search takes at least two forms by car and by phone. In both forms these are private solutions to public problems and indeed driven by the absence of the public altogether.
Moreover, the search for the hermetic seal is driven by real practical considerations.
The dispossessed of Philippine society cause constant anxieties for the possessed. Interestingly, this is not only the fear that the propertyless might steal property. Ownership is defined as much by use as by legal fiat. Any property that is not developed can be squatted upon and once a squatter has established him or herself, the nominal owner, should he or she wish to develop the land, is obliged to pay the squatters to move on. Anxieties are also created because the dispossessed-with nowhere else to go-occupy streets and parks for the purpose of shelter and business. Street hawkers colonize footpaths and roads to sell their wares; unused bits of public land are taken over by shanty dwellers. Through this process, what is nominally labeled as 'public space' is privatized by a kind of subaltern colonization with a concomitant array of complex rents to be paid by each of the stakeholders who are constantly redefining these liminal spaces. Examples abound but two can suffice here. The street vendor pays rent to the shopowner whose frontage they occupy (even though nominally the footpath is state property). The squatting vendor also pays 'fines' to the parking inspectors and the local policemen. Should the vendor successfully entrench their business they can sell it to others -usually new incoming families from the provinces. A second example is that of the parkers at busy intersections in peak hour traffic who receive commissions from jeepney and FX taxis on the side streets wishing to enter the main avenues to pay 'fees' to the traffic policemen to change the traffic directions. The cumulative effect of these informal, labyrinthine and highly imaginative private solutions and strategems is to surround public space with an aura that is uncanny, an aura that is present in its absence. What makes it uncanny is the inability of anyone to decide whether the space they are in is really public or private. The uncanny leaves people on a knife-edge, psychologically speaking. Living in a world permeated with uncanny meanings induces a sense of unaccountable fear and loathing-unaccountable because it has no clear source. It is fear and loathing induced by an irresolvable ambiguity that occurs when public and private meanings merge, or take on the characteristics of each other.
In Philippine life, the most private of space-the household-is filled with other people: friends, relations, and servants. Private never means privacy. Indigenous and medieval Spanish notions of the crowded house dominate. The always-filled private realm has a pseudopublic character. The family is the commons. Public life, in a mirror image of this, has a pseudo-private character. The most successful contemporary public spaces in the Philippines are the malls. Here, again, public and private merge. The malls are like cars-glass-and-metal bubbles. Like the car they are private spaces; but like the street they are also public, or at least simulacra of the public. The malls have their gates and the ubiquitous guards that regulate entry into the insulated bubble space. All social classes flock to them. They have replaced many of the traditional locales for promenading, socializing, even for religious services. In a tropical climate, the air-conditioning of these bubble spaces has become almost a public good. We should not overstate the uniqueness of this. Markets have long been key public spaces. One of the important functions of the European medieval church was to act as a protector for markets set up near by. Nonetheless the contemporary mall is an oddly private public. It is a very popular congregational space. Yet it is privately policed. Moreover it is a public space where the public theatre of government and opposition is absent.
Greek, Roman, medieval civic, Renaissance, and European colonial markets were always interweaved with municipal, legal, religious, educational and scientific public spheres.
The mall in contrast is the plaza privatized. In the mall-dominated city, what disappears is a visible center where markets are collocated with assemblies. Movie-going and charismatic religious assembly are among the few congregational activities to be found in the malls. The flipside of this is that formal and informal assembly space in Manila is scarce. This helps explain the fact that, in last decades of the twentieth century, it was the streets-in particular, the great EDSA Avenue 2 -that were the principal gathering place for opposition to government misrule. Streets function perfectly well as civic places on the occasion of massive outpourings of public feeling. In such cathartic moments, pedestrians momentarily reclaim the streets from the automobile. However, such "assemblies of the whole", the dream of direct democracy, are normally rare events. What is interesting about the Philippines is that it experienced a succession of "assemblies of the whole" at peak moments through the 1980s and 1990s-something quite exceptional in world-historical terms. Yet the country was not able to replicate this public wellspring in either the workings of its legislative assemblies and executive councils or in its artistic and scientific publics.
The fundamental reason for this is that public and private spheres in Manila have been reversed. So that while the private mall has become the public space par excellence, ordinary governance and politics, which is systemically corrupt, is for all intents and purposes a vast private bailiwick. So much so that, in the minds of the idealistic fraction of the professional middle class, non-government organizations have come to be the exemplars of public service.
This fuzzy in-distinction between public and private permeates all Filipino institutions. The public arts are almost entirely in the hands of private collectors. Charismatic religion, with its emphasis on the pietism, has made considerable in-roads into the terrain of traditional Catholicism. Pietism is private religion. It substitutes the affections of the heart for the public grace of beauty. The sentimentalization of the public sphere is captured perfectly in maxims such as the popular one that describes Manila as "the city of our affections". The classroom is socially esteemed but its imperatives of grades, qualifications, and teaching also colonize the In many ways the global port of Manila was a closed world. Manila became a city where the portal-threshold was also symbolically and practically a gated community. This was a place where the universal (catholic) city and its public significations of church-and-plaza were suborned to the imaginary of a castellated and garrisoned space. The garrison mentality subtlety over-determined the universal city.
Manila, of course, was not the Philippines. Nonetheless the intra muros model profoundly influenced the development of the archipelago as a whole -certainly of the other key colonial portal cities such as Vigan, Cebu City, and Zamboanga. On a very practical level, movement in and between islands was difficult. Notably absent in the Spanish Era was a welldeveloped infrastructure of public roads and harbors-or later railways. This is significant because it is this kind of public infrastructure that encourages traffic on a large scale between inside and outside. All great public realms, however they are articulated-be they church-andplaza, temple-and-agora, museum-and-mall-require portal-and-network infrastructures to under-gird their symbolic structures. 14 These portal-and-network infrastructures deliver the traffic-and the turnover-of persons, goods, and ideas that allows public space to be Spanish-era Philippine society developed around a series of institutions that strongly distinguished between an over-valued inside and an under-valued outside-e.g. between government (inside) and populace (outside). Where the church-and-plaza model relativized the distinctions between domains, e.g. between the domains of the mundane and the transcendent, the faithful and the faithless, the intra muros model presupposed that what was crucial was whether a person was "on the inside" in between "the walls of the domain". The inside-the inscape-was the protected and valued domain, and thus the place to be.
Living in the protected domain was equated with order-the order that overcomes the chaos that all societies must overcome. All societies create structures and arrangements.
Relatively few societies, though, invest heavily in public structures and arrangements. Creating order through public forms, rather than private hierarchies, is the exception, not the rule in social-historical experience. Thus, despite the implantation of the church-and-plaza model in the Philippines, it is not so surprising that closed system order in the end largely displaced open system order. Variations on the intra muros model became widespread through the Philippine archipelago. This was based on a social-symbolic understanding that the world was divided into domains with strong boundaries and that careful gate keeping was needed so as to regulate the relation between domain and environment in favor of the protected domain rather than open environment. This contrasts with the church-and-plaza model where the apse and square-or the portico and square-function as inter-mediation between domains. In the latter case, persons are constantly crossing from one domain to another through the portal spaces of public spheres. In this model, gateways operate to facilitate orderly traffic between domain and environment.
Portal or public space typically functions as a "third term" between two or more private (e.g.
household or institutional) spaces and their respective domains. In contrast, when "being inside the walls of the domain" is the key social value, then "being outside in the public" is aberrant behavior. Under these conditions, the clear distinction between the "third realm" of the public and the "primary" and "secondary" private domains evaporates. Simply put, everything becomes private because the public transit space between domains is eviscerated.
The very perception of order changes under these conditions. "Being inside" is valued because the inside is a place or space that is not chaotic. It is the place of calm and order. The The chief culprit undoubtedly was the fact that Spanish colonization was originally organized around the encomienda. This was a patrimonial system. Large estates were given to private settlers on a temporary basis by the Spanish crown. Along with land the settlers received the right to collect taxes. Public and private roles were indistinguishable. The state devolved, in a feudal-like manner, into hierarchically nested "private public" or "public private" entities.
What matters in this world is not that someone is performing a public or a private role, but rather that they are inside or outside the social-system "walls". The encomienda system was dismantled at the end of the seventeenth century. The system of provincial rule (alcaldías mayores) that replaced it, though, blurred the distinction between public and private just as much. Public offices were for sale. They were regarded as a source of private income for the office-holder. Underscoring the uncanny relation of public and private, many public functions in the Spanish colonial era were carried out by priests. These included responsibilities for examination, certification, census taking, statistics collection, and censorship. The Pauline distinction between "what is God's and what is Caesar's"-fundamental to the differentiation of public and private-was blithely ignored because the Spanish state couldn't manage to fill its offices with persons with the required competencies. Giving permissions-required by the state's bureaucratic law-in return for bribes was the omnivorous preoccupation of public officers.
One might have expected that the opponents of the Spanish might have overturned the intra muros social-symbolic system. But, if anything, they amplified it and reinforced it.
Nationalist opposition to the Spanish Empire is a reminder that in politics enemies often have a great deal in common. Philippine nationalists simply turned the intra muros model against the colonial power. They portrayed Spain as the bad outside power and the antithesis of the good inside power of the Philippine nation. The nation, as the good inside, was defined both in cultural and economic terms. Political good was equated with authentic local culture and a closed commercial state. In so many ironic ways, this mimicked the language policies of the sixteenth-century Church orders and the old mercantilist trade policies of the Spanish Crown.
The American Period: Success and Failure
The attempt to create a nationalist state during the uprising against Spain in 1899 was stymied by the Americans. For close to forty years, the United States administered the Philippines under various guises. The fact that the United States replaced Spain as an administering power was of considerable historical significance. This is almost the only time in history that America established a formal colonial territory on any sizeable scale. In conventional developmental terms, the Americans as the colonizing power did "all the right things". 15 They built an extensive road, rail and harbor network-creating the basis for an infrastructural public. They put in place a good public education system. They made an international language (English) the medium of trade, government, and education. They carefully prepared the ground for democratic self-government. 16 They encouraged free speech.
They opened up American markets to Philippine goods. They created a provincial government (Moro Province) for the Philippine Muslim minority. 17 In specific cases, they had spectacular successes. They drove up the literacy rate from 5% in 1898 to 65% in 1935. Yet, in the most global sense, American rule was a failure. It failed because it could not reverse the long-term decline of the Philippine economy relative to the wealthiest countries in the world economy.
Comparative world data for the early nineteenth century is sketchy, and to some extent informed guess work, but nonetheless revealing. In 1820, the Philippines ranked the 18 th wealthiest nation in the world (measured in terms of gross domestic product per capita 22 It began the new millennium with a gross domestic product per capita that was 40% of the world's average, only in advance of averages for Asia and Africa.
However the figures are sliced and diced, and whatever we regard as the starting-point for reliable figures, the trajectory of Philippine wealth creation moved downwards without relief for over a century and a half. And whatever definition we might afford the polity and economy of the archipelago across the centuries, Manila is a prime player and mover in this story. In 1820, the wealth of the country was 105% of the world's average. By 1870, Philippine per capita wealth had fallen to 88% of the world's average. In 1913, it was 69%. In 1950, it was 50%. In 1973, it was 48%; and in 1984, 46%. 23 As is apparent from the figures, the long-term decline began in the latter part of the Spanish Era. Did free trade cause the decline? After all, Spanish mercantilism was abandoned in 1834 for free trade under pressure from Britain, the United States and other powers. From that time, the Philippines entered on a path of relative decline. In stark contrast, the new wealthy economies-Japan and the United States-that emerged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were protectionist. America was heavily protected till the 1950s, and contemporary Japan still is. Prima facie this suggests that the intra muros model should have been persisted with in preference to an open system of trade. But appearances can be deceiving.
Indeed, for the first half of the twentieth century, "free trade" meant preferential access to American markets for Philippine goods. This was a bilateral (in effect a mercantilist) arrangement that eliminated duties on American goods exported to the Philippines and reciprocally on most Philippine goods going to the United States. 24 The Philippines was not an
American state, but, as a quasi-colony, it angled to be treated as such in trade matters. As it was, neither liberal "free trade" nor mercantilist "preferential trade" made any noticeable difference to the long-term decline of the Philippine economy. The United States and Japan illustrate why this was so. Both were cases of successful modernity. Both were states of permanent innovation.
Trade policy was not the key to this in either case. America till the 1950s limited access to its markets, then it liberalized its trade barriers. Yet, even when it was a protectionist state, it still had very porous borders, allowing the easy entry of people and ideas. The Japanese model is different again. Japan has always limited entry of both goods and people. Yet it has voraciously imported ideas. Indeed the Japanese did so long before Commodore Perry's arrival on their shores in the 1850s. 25 In contrast, the Philippines in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries lacked the key drivers of successful modernity. It did not aggressively import people (skills) or ideas (knowledge). Exclusion of aliens and distrust of foreign capital was a regular theme of Philippine nationalism. 26 The historic Constitutional Convention of 1935 conceived a principle whereby the rights and privileges of "natural born" citizens were superior to naturalized citizens. It also recommended, as a matter of principle, limiting the employment of alien labor. 27 Education nationalism mirrored this in the realm of the arts and sciences. 28 The 1935
Constitution actually provided additional hours in schools to teach nationalism. The ambition of education nationalism was to raise ethnological study above the ideas of foreign pedagogues. It demonstrates that the Americans at least imagined Manila as city like Washington or Chicago. 35 It could have been as great an urban creation as, say, Sydney or Melbourne in the twentiethcentury inter-war era. The Burnham Plan was still the focus for urban renewal in Manila in the early 1990s. This is evident in the "clean up" of the Ermita and Malate areas, and the redevelopment of the Roxas Boulevard with a promenade. 36 Burnham's design of Luneta Park provided a major point for religious and political meetings. 37 The Plan successfully integrated the Pasig River and Manila Bay waterfronts. It provided a unity between the important civic buildings of the era-the Post Office, City Hall, museum, and government buildings. Indeed, at the end of twentieth century, Burnham's Manila was still the only part of the city that "breathed", providing that crucial urban portal-public sense of "in and out". 38 It was the only part of the city friendly to walkers. 39 For all of this, Burnham's Plan suggested only what might be. It did not represent what was. Its rationality remained frozen in anticipation, until it became a memory without ever having been a reality. The real triumph of the Americans in the Philippines was not in urban morphology, but in public policy. In particular, the Americans radically transformed the field of public health. 40 They aggressively promoted a culture of hygiene. This policy and practice was the product of the Progressive-era Protestant American ethos-a White Anglo Saxon Protestant ethos-of a "clean" society, "clean" city, and a "clean" politics. It was inspired by turn-of-the-twentieth century American Progressive urban reformism-a curious tradition created by an anti-big-city rural Protestant middle class intent on "cleaning up" the new, spectacular, often corrupt, dense, impersonal, sky-scraping cities like New York that were utterly unlike anything previously seen in urban history. 41 This new urbanism attracted millions from Catholic and Orthodox Europe.
If you doubt that "clean" is a civic ideal, take a look at the work of Lewis Mumford.
Mumford was a literary child of the Progressive Age and America's great historian of the city.
In his many books, he returned time and again to the theme of public hygiene. 42 Just like the American colonial administrators in the Philippines, Mumford viewed hygenics as one of the chief criteria of a successful civics. In the case of the Philippines this model should not be sniffed at. Despite its low per capita income, the country has had tremendous success in preventive public health. It experienced very low rates of HIV/AIDS, SARS, bird flu, and other turn-of-the-twenty-first-century pandemic agents. 43 When African societies in contrast were devastated by HIV/AIDS, this was no mean achievement.
If the Philippines learnt from the Americans the ways of a "clean" society, the efforts to implant a "clean" city or a "clean" politics were markedly less successful. The civic hygiene model emphasized the idea of the garden city. Gardens represented clean air and beneficent sunshine. This had little traction on an urban scale in booming Manila. The population-swell of Metro Manila in the second half of the twentieth century left the city with few green spaces or parks. Notably also, professional middle class efforts to stamp out the "dirt" of corrupt politics, the legacy of centuries of patrimonial culture, had virtually no effect at all. Contrast this with the Sino-Fabianism of Singapore, where legally enforced clean habits and a very efficient waterand-sewage socialism went hand-in-hand with carefully husbanded green areas and very strict regulation of corrupt behaviors. 44 Most importantly of all, the Singaporeans also created a public sphere that they placed high store on. This is often misunderstood, because commentators habitually think of a public sphere as the place of peer-style coffeehouse debates and institutions of criticism. These have been late arriving in Singapore. But the city-state nonetheless was very successful at creating an infrastructural public.
In contrast the Americans acquiesced in traditional Iberian-Filipino patrimonial social structures. This killed the Burnham Plan. To be successful, a city plan has to be congruent with social behaviors. Burnham's Plan laid a civic model over a patrimonial society. In practical terms this left the real estate and the social economy of Manila in the hands of powerful landed families. The families simply ignored government planning laws, or became their own law. In the course of the twentieth century, these families and their successors developed an urban system that was reminiscent of the encomienda system.
The "New Encomienda" System
In the 1920s and 1930s groups like the Legarda, Araneta, and Tuason families, who transformed their familial estates into rental and market properties, represented the "new encomienda" system. The social weight of this new urban landlordism had a peculiar distorting effect. It allowed the proprietor kin to become de facto city planners as well as developers and landlords. As far as the families were concerned, there was no real distinction between these roles. Anyone familiar with late Roman history will appreciate that this is also the story of the origins of feudalism. The estate developers in Manila created what is in effect an urban feudalism. Because they controlled so much land, they could ignore or circumvent Americantype civic planning regulations that required a proper, proportionate quantity of public space to be developed alongside residential and commercial space. They eventually built their own "manorial" cities within Metro Manila.
What was at work here was not simply the effects of money and power. Just as crucial was the effect of the social imagination. To illustrate this, consider the case of Chicago in the nineteenth century. There, powerful plutocrats played an enormous role in turning Chicago into a world city. But the plutocrats did it by funding large civic projects and creating and landscaping large areas of attractive public space. The contrast is telling. Chicago's plutocracy was civic-minded. 45 It was civic-minded because the social imagination of Chicago was civicminded. This civic-minded character prevailed because, from its start, Chicago was a stranger city. It was a settler city devoted to the constant traffic of goods and people, and later on cultures and ideas. Chicago's plutocracy grasped that public space was simply a step-up from the wharves and docks and loading bays with which it had made its fortunes. In contrast, the twentieth-century Manila model stressed estate-power-power over land-rather than circulatory power. And the estate-power was and is in the hands of particular families. Estatepower is patrimonial power. This is why our recovering of the term 'encomienda' is not merely theatrical or analogous. Bonifacio, and began to turn it into a "global city". 48 The explicit aim was to fuse global high technology and infrastructure standards with an appropriately fortified city mentality.
In each of these cases, the distinction between state and estate is blurred. 51 Even when projects were completed, as in the case of her Cultural Center of the Philippines, the combination of Peter-the-Great like ruthlessness in its construction with a romantic ideology of national cultural originality produced a monument to the lonely hubris of the dictator-family. Built on reclaimed land on Manila Bay, and stuck out on the bay out of reach of the populace, the CCP presents an empty spectacle. The Leandro Locsin-designed building makes the obligatory nod to indigenous form, but its prime signification is that of a compound building. It is defensible stockade space-a cantilevered monolith. It is perfect for a showpiece public culture that in fact has no public.
Nation should not be confused with public. The typical patrimonial cultural strategy is to collect things. 52 The Marcos pair conceived an open door national repository for the work of "national artists" and the performances of "national companies"-in tacit opposition to the private collections of well-to-do Manila families. This cultural one-upmanship, however, was not the triumph of the public over the private. Rather national collecting was simply the more acceptable face of the legendary patrimonial-turned-kleptocratic acquisitiveness of the regime.
The Marcos pair transformed the private not into the public but into piracy, and ordinary corruption into grand larceny. Measured against this, the patrimony of family capitalism-estate capitalism-is quite rational. It "simply" internalizes public externalities. The resulting city of Fort Bonifacio unconsciously mimics the semantics of the encampment space that it was named for. The estate-cum-stockade city model punctuates the larger metropolitan city with a series of quasi-private compounds with strongly policed boundaries-some visible and some invisible. Like all of these kinds of corporate cities within Metro Manila, the spaces of Fort Bonifacio are securely bounded-in the manner of a gated community-against the teeming city outside. Even when the "walls" erected are invisible, they are walls nonetheless. They exist lest the carefully constructed order of private city is made chaotic. The paradox is that its planners know what is expected of a civic development. Fort
Bonifacio proudly promotes public art, public events and public order, and builds a careful civic order out of efficient infrastructure (not least, the infrastructure of streetscapes). Yet it still can't mesh these convincingly with each level of everyday life. Its public space is curiously empty.
Elsewhere in unregulated Manila, streets teeming with life exclude lucent order; the order of the high-tech feudal-fort-gated city however excludes streets filled with life.
The "new encomienda" system has some features that are analogous with a "company town". It is proprietary system, but not in the sense of a public corporation. Its capital is familial or patrician. Family-patrician capital instinctively creates service classes and private security forces. Combined with landlord domination of urban real estate and "manorial" style planning power, this leads to a modern feudalism. It does not have serfs "tied to the soil"-nonetheless the poor clients of this system live and work in conditions where the procedural law of the state has little effect. The new feudalism mixes market rentals and market labor with patron-client service relationships and kin preference, "manorial" separation from a weak and corrupt state, production and service based on labor rather than skills and knowledge, and private armed force.
A parallel can be drawn with the railway baron George Pullman and his creation of a model company town-the also modestly named Pullman-in South Chicago in the nineteenth
century. An important difference, though, is that Pullman's megalomaniac town was the exception, not the rule, in the Chicago city-region-and, in practice, it was atypical of American urbanism and indeed of American capitalism. Company towns typically appeared in America where the local economy still had a residual patrician character-from New England textile mill towns to Kentucky coal mining towns. 53 One study of these towns in the 1920s reported that they suffered some of the things that contemporary Manila suffers from. "The company townscape exhibited a uniform appearance. The absence of visual interest was the rule, a result from repeated building designs. The lack of trees and other landscaping did not mitigate that sterile appearance of rows of identical houses. Much of the infrastructure available in contemporary urban settings was missing: paved roads, water mains, sewer systems, and lights were generally non-existent." 54 In the family-corporate city, the public sphere is turned into a private domain. In legitimacy. The price of that legitimacy is that the poor be allowed to continue to live in public space (near railway tracks, under bridges, on river embankments, and so on). The poor provide the cheap labor to build the next round of "manorial" cities and enclaves. The poor then maintain, serve and secure these stockade cities, both their own DIY squatter cities and those of the rich. The paradox of insecurity for the rich is that they employ the very same minions who they most fear to protect them.
Urban Morphology: Searching for the Platonic City
It might be argued that Manila's problems stem from its domination by private interests.
But this is a world in which "the private" is a trump card. It is a trump card because of the high valuation of the "inside". Between the private development of the rich and the private development of the poor, there is little or no public realm left over. Because Manila is not a city of strangers who imagine and construct the public as the commons, the public is what is leftover after territory and space is appropriated and occupied. As the rapid population growth of the metropolis continues unrestrained there is little left over. We clearly see the failures in nationalist projects like Quezon City, which was loosely modeled after the Baroque planning of the "city beautiful" urbanism together with elements of Modernism. 56 Like a lot of misconceived Baroque or Modern urban plans, its monumentality is false, and its public space is unattractive. It is "big"-it has big parks, a big roundabout, and a big national research university. To successfully do "big" on an urban scale requires thick, dense public textures. Quezon City planners did "big" as empty space, much of which the urban poor has inevitably colonized. Its failure was the lack of civic imagination-in particular the lack of understanding that big civics requires the complement of medium-scale and small-scale civics. Such space needs to scale. Quezon City did not scale. Scalability is a Platonic value. 57 It is a universal value. Nationalist urbanism instinctively rejected universalism. It treated the geometries of big, medium and small as a handmaiden to its romantic ideals. Such ideals, so often, turn into a wasteland. 58 Much closer in spirit to the Platonic city, and yet curiously several steps removed from it, is Singapore. It has no romantic wastelands at all. It is prosperous, functional, decent, and
efficient. Yet it suffers from an oddly un-Platonic condition: soul-less-ness. This can be overstated, especially when many Western romantics prefer the pornography of the wasteland to decent living conditions. Yet, given the large Singaporean diaspora that quietly chooses to live abroad, it can hardly be said that the charge of soul-less-ness is completely off-target either.
Even the energetic Singaporean guardian-officials admit that, after a half century of development in a utilitarian mode, Singapore found itself lacking a "creative dimension". 59 Its hygienic rationalism and its high-quality infrastructure provision on its own terms could not reverse this deficit. So the guardians of the city-state began to talk openly of their desire to turn
Singapore into a "renaissance city". 60 Think of Singapore's limits in these terms: there is no chaos on Singapore's streets.
Chaos is planned out of the Sino-Fabian city. But imagination is also cramped. The problem of Here, though, we need to be careful not to fall into the trap of post-modern stereotyping.
The argument being advanced is not that rules create a disciplined order that is stifling, while "chaosmos" is the condition of inventiveness. Chaos is certainly not inventive. The cost of chaos is evident when we look at the case of Manila contrasted with Singapore. Singapore has successfully created a public order. The order is stiff and contrived, not to say at times punitive.
But this achievement should not be underestimated either. Genuine public culture of any kind is historically rare. Most human activity-from the household to the state-is private, even where it is official. The historical act of differentiating between public and private is very difficult, and most societies blur the distinction in practice.
Manila is a prime example of a city in which the meanings of public and private have been rendered systematically ambiguous. This systemic ambiguity lends public and private life an uncanny edge. It is impossible to escape the sense that "something is not quite right" when all space becomes uncanny and has a pervading sense of being "close-to-chaos". It is not literally chaotic. No society or city can endure actual chaos for very long, and survive intact.
Rather this space is "close-to-chaos" in the sense that its incipient public order always seems on the edge of dissolve. While this may sound attractive when described on paper, in everyday life it is most unattractive. There is no doubt a public domain that is "close-to-chaos" can produce energy-as in the "teeming life" tag that is invariably applied by visitors to old Asia-Pacific cities. But, because it has no container, this energy is also wearying for the denizens of "closeto-chaos" cities. The uncanny condition turns life into a vain struggle to secure what good order produces: lucidity, clarity, and the satisfactions of pattern rationality. During the postmodern period, Western social science made a mistake in dismissing the virtue of lucidity as the work of an overzealous gardener who obsessively trims the social bush. But no inhabitant of Manila would ever tell you that the hours spent needlessly in traffic jams or searching for un-signposted streets is a good thing. The product of an ad-hoc city topology, in turn the tainted fruit of an ad hoc new feudalism, these inconveniences are wasteful of the energy they create. Chaos is the privilege of the over-endowed. For everyone else, well-structured public space is essential.
This is especially so in low-income societies and developing economies. This is desperately so in the world's most fragmented, privatized and un-public of cities-Manila. The best illustration of the over-inflated reputation of "education" in the scheme of things comes from the experiences of those great minds Newton and Nietzsche. Imagine European science or arts without their contribution? Now both of them in their whole teaching careers had a bare handful of students-and probably none of these students understood what they said. It is not clear at all that "education" in the modern sense of the word can produce the kind of middle class essential for great periods of cultural and commercial flowering. 4 One expression of this is the lack of any overviews of Manila public cultures (e.g., the live music scene) for consumption by locals-there are no weekly magazine websites. Most clubs come and go frequently, and do so outside the realm of publicity. This feeds cell-phone dependency and obsession. It renders knowledge of even routine cultural events curiously private or fraternal.
Peter Murphy

5
The problems of the failure to rationalize are well summed up in a report on Japan written in 1915 by an Australian expert: "My impression as to your cheap labor was soon disillusioned when I saw your people at work. No doubt they are lowly paid, but the return is equally so; to see your men at work made me feel that you are a very satisfied easy-going race who reckon time is no object. When I spoke to some managers they informed me that it was impossible to change the habits of national heritage. In 1834, the port of Manila was open to foreign traders. Between 1855 and 1877, six other ports through the archipelago became free trade centers.
13
Spanish was more widely-know in the American era than in the Spanish era. "Before 1900, malaria, dysentery, smallpox, tuberculosis, and especially cholera had decimated the population and caused untold miseries to the masses. This was so because while the Spanish colonial government introduced vaccination and created offices charged with guarding the health of the people, the good intention… was never implemented, or at best only desultorily so, owing to bureaucratic inefficiency, stupidity, or incompetence and indolence. Public and private hygiene and sanitation were unsatisfactory, resulting in high mortality rates. When the Americans came, however, they immediately set the government agencies in motion to minimize, if not arrest completely, the spread of various diseases and to improve the health of the people through proper diet. Epidemics that used to migrate freely to the Philippines were either prevented or minimized by the establishment of the quarantine service which was supervised by competent American physicians and public health officers. It was a difficult undertaking as the Americans found out, for their invincible enemies… were not so much diseases as the apathy, ignorance, and superstitions of the people… Trained field men were sent to the provinces to explain the virtues of modern hygiene and sanitation, while the public schools included in their curricula a course on hygiene and sanitation to give the school children an elementary knowledge of how cleanliness could be next to Godliness. This effort at improving the health of the people paid off: in 1898 the death rate per 1,000 persons was 30.5 percent, but in 1907 it plunged to 21.9 percent. Except in 1917-1918 when cholera and smallpox epidemics broke out, the mortality rate per 1,000 persons progressively diminished in succeeding years." T. The word "Makati" derives from the Tagalog word kati, which means tide, and refers to the tide of the Pasig River that flows through Manila into the Bay. 47 This is the equivalent of the late twentieth-century New York City property developer Donald Trump taking a whole area of Manhattan Island-let's say the East Village-turning it into a new Wall Street, and then renaming it Trump City. Even Trump's engorged ego was not capable of this.
48
They called themselves the Metro Pacific Group. 49 They even blocked Makati becoming an official city until 1995.
